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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
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This is a summary of the report cited above for inclusion in the Proceedings of the Sixth 
Annual Acquisition Research Symposium hosted by NPS (May 2009).  The report itself greatly 
exceeds the length guidelines for the Proceedings.  The topics raised here are discussed in 
greater detail within the body of that report. 
Summary 
International defense industrial affairs are becoming increasing global and increasingly 
complex.  This report is a continuation of the authors’ efforts to provide insights and analytical 
frameworks useful for understanding ongoing developments in the global defense market.1 
In this stage of that overall project, we focus primarily on defense industrial firms and 
their relationships with their sovereign customers—considering the organization of Boeing 787 
development and production, the KC-45 aerial tanker competition, and European defense firms’ 
direct investment in the US defense market. 
Our Cases 
In the 787 case (Section II), we observe that even experienced companies like Boeing 
can run afoul of the complexities of coordinating a multinational, multiform venture.  We suspect 
this problem is not unique to Boeing, and will, if not satisfactorily addressed, limit the scope and 
success of multinational projects in the defense sector as well. 
The KC-45 (Section III), at least to date, seems to illustrate a new weakness of defense 
establishments relative to their suppliers.  The failure to successfully award a KC-45 contract to 
the EADS-Northrop Grumman team (after protest to the GAO) raises some troubling questions.  
Is it possible to award a protest-proof contract for a major defense system?  Doesn’t the buyer 
side of the US defense market more resemble a quarrelsome committee than the classic model 
of the sovereign monopsonist?  With increasingly large, winner-take-all competitions, what’s the 
potential for procurement gridlock—the apparent state of the KC-45?  Will the concentration of 
buyer power (through smaller numbers) and the resultant increase in agility give suppliers 
exploitable advantages over their customers? 
Our discussion of foreign direct investment in US defense industries focuses on three 
European firms: BAE, EADS and Finmeccanica (Section IV).  Our research was informed in 
significant part through confidential interviews with high-level, Washington-based officials 
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intimately familiar with the issues at hand.  The central theme of this discussion is the interplay 
between the motivations for these firms to enter the US defense market, the US regulatory 
environment (which constrains such entries), and the corporate strategies intended to work with 
(and around) those legal barriers.   
Our discussion of these three firms suggests three interesting conclusions.  First, entry 
into the US defense market is indeed motivated primarily by the relatively high level of the US 
defense budget, relative to those in Europe (consistent with prevailing conventional wisdom).  
Second, “Buy American” and restrictions on direct investment have proven to be penetrable—to 
a significant degree.  Finally, a two-way street of defense industrial trade between the US and 
Europe appears to be emerging as fully fledged reality—after decades of heated debate and 
limited progress. 
Conclusions 
Our conclusions follow.  Many are not striking (or new to us), but taken together, we feel 
they are significant and useful. 
Complexity and cost have changed and are fundamentally changing the nature of 
economies of scale.  Production runs that usefully exploit economies of scale and learning 
curves are increasingly beyond the reach of single nation-states.  Accordingly, new weapon 
systems (such as the Joint Strike Fighter) have increasingly become international ventures—
albeit with senior partners.  On the supply side, defense firms have undertaken more projects 
featuring outsourcing arrangements and strategic partnerships.  In addition, the number of first-
tier defense suppliers has significantly declined. 
Inter-firm relationships are much more a product of situation and project type than by the 
firm boundaries of more traditional thought.  Even very large firms (such as Boeing and 
Lockheed-Martin) can compete in some areas and collaborate in others.  This has contributed to 
the increased complexity of both the market structure and the management of major projects. 
Finally, the combination of reduced numbers of suppliers and the complexity of 
globalized defense markets has significantly increased the market power of defense industrial 
suppliers relative to their (sovereign) customers.  Among other things, it appears that the 
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